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No.  10-3296 
___________ 
 
 
RAMI SHALHOUB,          
   Appellant 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES; SECRETARY, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; SECRETARY, U.S. IMMIGRATION 
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR 
FOR DETENTION; WARDEN, YORK COUNTY PRISON, YORK, PENNSYLVANIA 
 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-09-cv-00976) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
On October 27, 2011 
 
 
Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: March 30, 2012) 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 Rami Shalhoub appeals the District Court’s order denying his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  At the time Shalhoub filed his petition, United States Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) was holding him in custody pending his removal from the 
country.  He argued that this detention, because it was prolonged and imposed without a 
bond hearing, was both statutorily unauthorized and a violation of his constitutional right 
to due process.  He has since been released, however, and we find that there is no 
reasonable expectation that he will again be detained.  We conclude therefore that his 
petition is moot and we will dismiss it. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 Shalhoub is a native and citizen of Palestine.  On December 3, 2005, he gained 
entry into the United States through the use of a fraudulent passport.  His illegal entry 
was eventually detected, and on November 13, 2006, he was apprehended by a New 
Jersey police officer and detained by ICE.  Removal proceedings were immediately 
commenced, in which Shalhoub was charged with unlawfully entering the United States 
with a visa obtained by using another individual’s identity.1
 Separately from his removal proceedings, Shalhoub was criminally charged with 
(1) fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1546(a) and 2, and (2) aggravated identity theft during and in relation to that fraud and 
misuse, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(a)(1) and (2).  On December 11, 2007, 
 
                                            
1 Shalhoub obtained the visa to enter the United States by using a Jordanian passport 
bearing his photograph but the name of his cousin, a Jordanian citizen. 
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Shalhoub pleaded guilty to these charges, was convicted, and was sentenced to twenty-
five months in prison.   
 On account of these convictions, ICE added an additional charge to Shalhoub’s 
removal proceedings:  that he was an alien who had been convicted of an “aggravated 
felony.”2  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  On August 11, 2008, an immigration judge 
(IJ) issued a final order directing that Shalhoub be removed from the United States.  
However, because the judge found that Shalhoub faced a risk of being tortured in Jordan, 
the order prohibited ICE from removing him through Jordan and specified that he be 
removed through Israel.3
 On November 7, 2008, Shalhoub was released from criminal custody and 
immediately taken into ICE custody.  ICE began the process of removing Shalhoub 
through Israel, but its efforts were frustrated by the Israeli government’s refusal to grant 
the necessary permission for him to transit its borders.  On September 1, 2009, ICE 
therefore filed a motion to reopen Shalhoub’s immigration proceedings in order to obtain 
authority to remove him instead through Jordan.  On September 16, 2009, the 
proceedings were reopened, and Shalhoub filed for protection from removal through 
Jordan.  The (IJ) ultimately issued an order granting Shalhoub withholding of removal to 
Jordan, which ICE appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 
 
                                            
2 An offense of passport fraud for which the term of imprisonment is at least twelve 
months constitutes an aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(P). 
 
3 Shalhoub’s removal to Palestine could be completed only by transit through one of 
these two countries.   
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 Shalhoub remained in ICE custody throughout this process. On January 12, 2010, 
he filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he requested that the 
District Court order either that he be released or that he be given a bond hearing.  On 
June 1, 2010, the Court denied this request.  It found that Shalhoub was not subject to a 
final order of removal because, in light of ICE’s then pending appeal to the BIA, his 
removal proceedings had not yet been completed.  And because of Shalhoub’s visa fraud 
conviction, the court also held that, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B), detention 
during the entire pendency of his removal proceedings was mandatory.  Finally, the court 
held that, considering the complications that arose in completing Shalhoub’s removal, his 
detention was not unreasonably long and thus did not violate his right to due process. 
 On July 29, 2010, Shalhoub filed this appeal.  He argues that, when removable 
aliens detained pre-final order, detention may last for only a “brief period,” not for a 
period as prolonged as his own detention.4
                                            
4 At the time he filed his amended habeas petition, Shalhoub had been in ICE custody for 
approximately fourteen months. 
  He claims that, by statute, ICE can keep him 
in custody for a prolonged period only if it shows at a bond hearing that it has a strong 
justification for doing so. Shalhoub contends in the alternative that prolonged detention 
without this procedural safeguard violates his right to due process.  On these bases, he 
asks for either his “immediate release under reasonable conditions of supervision” or 
“that he immediately be provided a constitutionally adequate hearing where the 
government bears the burden of demonstrating that his continued detention is justified.” 
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 On February 28, 2011, ICE’s appeal of the withholding of removal to Jordan was 
resolved after multiple proceedings before both the BIA and the IJ when Shalhoub was 
again granted withholding of removal to Jordan.  On May 27, Shalhoub was released 
from detention under an Order of Supervision.  On July 26, ICE filed a motion with the 
immigration court to identify Israel as his country of removal.  On August 25, 2011, the 
IJ issued an amended removal order directing that Shalhoub be removed to Israel, which 
ICE did not appeal.  ICE argues that these events have rendered Shalhoub’s habeas 
petition moot and has moved to dismiss the petition. 
II.   DISCUSSION 
 Article III of the United States Constitution empowers federal courts to exercise 
their judicial power only over actual cases and controversies.  North Carolina v. Rice, 
404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971).  Federal courts therefore have no authority “to decide 
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.”  Id.  This 
limitation “subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate.”  
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990).  For this reason, any time 
that the parties to a case come to “lack a legally cognizable interest in [its] outcome,” the 
case is deemed moot and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  Murphy v. Hunt, 455 
U.S. 478, 481, 484 (1982).  If there is no meaningful relief that can be granted to a 
plaintiff in satisfaction of his claims, he lacks this requisite interest.  See Calderon v. 
Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996); Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206-07 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
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 In his habeas petition, Shalhoub requests only that he be granted either supervised 
release or a bond hearing through which he could obtain such release.  However, because 
ICE has now released him, there is no meaningful relief that he can obtain on his habeas 
petition.  As a result, that petition is moot. 
 Shalhoub urges that, notwithstanding his release, our jurisdiction persists because 
his detention is “capable of repetition while evading review.”  See Turner v. Rogers, 564 
U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2515 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Under this exception to the mootness doctrine, federal courts possess jurisdiction over a 
dispute if “(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior 
to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same 
complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.”  Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  We find, though, that there is no reasonable expectation that 
Shalhoub will again be subjected to immigration detention.  We reach this conclusion 
because, now that there is a final order of removal in his case, Shalhoub is ineligible for 
pre-final order detention. That type of detention could be imposed only if ICE 
successfully reopened Shalhoub’s immigration proceedings.  However, given that ICE 
obtained its desired result in the most recent round of proceedings – an order identifying 
Israel as his country of removal – we find that there is no reasonable expectation that this 
will occur.  Although ICE can hold removable aliens in custody after the entry of a final 
order of removal, it ordinarily can do so only for a ninety day removal period, see 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)-(3), which, in Shalhoub’s case, has already expired.  While this 
detention can be extended in certain exceptional circumstances, see id. at §§ 
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1231(a)(1)(C), (6), Shalhoub’s release at the approximate conclusion of the removal 
period and the statement in his Order of Supervision that he was being released because 
that period had expired lead us to conclude that there is no reasonable expectation that 
ICE will attempt to do so. 
 Shalhoub argues that his petition is not moot under our decision in Diop v. ICE, 
656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011), but that case is distinguishable.  In Diop, we did find that a 
removable alien’s challenge to his pre-final order detention was not mooted by his release 
because his detention was capable of repetition while evading review.  In that case, the 
alien was released as a result of the vacatur of the criminal conviction that mandated his 
pre-final order detention.  Because the Government’s position implied that the 
reinstatement of the conviction on a then-pending appeal would require the alien to go 
back into custody, we held that there was a reasonable expectation that he would once 
again be detained.  However, no similar circumstances are present in this case. 
 Shalhoub additionally claims that our decision in United States v. Frumento, 552 
F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1977), requires us to adjudicate his appeal.  We disagree.  In Frumento, 
we exercised jurisdiction over a challenge to an order of contempt and confinement 
imposed on a witness who refused to testify at a criminal trial even after the trial had 
ended and the witness had been released.  But we did so on the basis of our finding that 
the witness’s confinement was “capable of repetition,” because he “probably” would be 
called to testify again at the trials of other defendants in related criminal proceedings.  Id. 
at 537-40; 540 n.9.  As we have already explained, however, in Shaloub’s case, there is 
no reasonable expectation of further detention.  While we stated in dictum in Frumento 
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that we would have exercised jurisdiction even if we hypothetically “could not [have] 
construct[ed] or project[ed] any ‘capability of repetition’” in that case, id. at 540, we 
explained that that was because review of an order of confinement that is effective only 
for the duration of a criminal trial, “as a practical matter is [otherwise] not available.”  Id. 
at 541.  The same is not true for review of immigration detention that is allegedly 
prolonged and indefinite.  Frumento thus fails to establish that Shaloub’s habeas petition 
is not moot. 
III.   CONCLUSION 
 Because Shalhoub’s habeas petition is moot, we lack jurisdiction to resolve his 
appeal.  We will accordingly vacate the District Court’s order and remand the case with 
directions to dismiss the petition.  See N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 
F.2d 25, 34 (3d Cir. 1985). 
